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Determining Defense:
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Emilyn Tuomala
Advised by Dr. Perkoski
POLS 4997W

Why has interest in the U.S. missile defense systems changed over time? The common belief is
that national security decisions and technological choices are rationally determined in response
to external threats. Is it possible that technological defense decisions are shaped by bureaucracy
and political ideology as well? I measure interest in missile defense through the amount of
money allocated to these projects, evaluating how it has changed since Ronald Reagan first
announced the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983. To assess why it changes over time, I
evaluate congressional and presidential politics, national security strategy reports, and other
documents to determine the relative influence of each. While I find that the decision-making
process underlying missile defense is obscure and often opaque, both threat and ideology shape
interest in these systems.
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“I support development and deployment of a limited national missile defense. Few, if any of our
duties surpass our obligation to provide for the common defense of our nation.”
Former U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman

Introduction

Maintaining national security is no simple task. Keeping the United States safe from
attacks and threats is naturally the principal role of the military, but how exactly does the
military execute this? Deploying missile defense systems is one strategy, with paramount
importance in today’s technologically advanced world. These defense systems are used to
intercept incoming enemy missiles before they can reach a country. Missile defense first
achieved notoriety during the Reagan administration with the Strategic Defense Initiative,
otherwise labeled ‘Star Wars’, and has since grown to a worldwide industry valued at over $55
Billion USD (Marketwatch 2018).
How has government interest in missile defense changed since its beginning in 1983?
Specifically, how has this interest helped missile defense evolve from the Strategic Defense
Initiative, a technology once considered implausible, to being a vital portion of the U.S. national
defense system? How is this change of significance reflected in surrounding legislation and other
government documents? As no military purchase is possible without prior allocation in the
federal defense budget, the budget and money spent on missile defense should depict the level of
need or importance of such systems for each given year. However, I believe this relationship
does not accurately reflect the motivations behind all missile defense procurement. To
investigate what factors shape the missile defense budget, I first look at the strategic threat
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environment from the 1980s until now, to determine what the United States labeled as a threat
and why missile defense was considered the necessary solution. Conventional wisdom says that
the military is a reactionary force, meaning each branch directly faces a current threat and adjust
its strategies and operations in order to combat it. However, the threat environment is not always
a consistent measure of technological necessity, as it is possible to conceptualize and act upon
threats in differing ways (Critchley 1979). Furthermore, in order to maintain a strategic
advantage a state may choose to keep many of its capabilities secret, meaning a government
trying to formulate defense policy in response may rely on conjecture or suspicions of what they
may have to fight against one day. Based on this presumed lack of perfect knowledge and my
understanding of pertaining literature, I believe it necessary to explore other possible
bureaucratic influences like politician support. Upon completing my analysis, I find that both
factors – the threat environment and the influence of Congressional policymakers – are of equal
significance in the decision to fund and ultimately deploy a national missile defense system.
Without funds, the Department of Defense is unable to procure and develop new technologies;
without a reason (threat), the Department of Defense will struggle to prove the importance of
such systems to policymakers, and without policymakers, no budget will be passed allowing for
weapons procurement. Funding for the Missile Defense Agency year to year did fluctuate, but
changing political majorities in the executive and legislative branches did not directly result in
increases or decreases. Instead, missile defense funding tended to rise as a part of the increasing
general defense budget, related to increasing threats the United States faced each year. I found
both the threats faced by the United States and the political influences of parties and bureaucracy
each shared influence over the funding for missile defense, but determining which factor takes
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precedence was not feasible in this study. Therefore, I cannot say the interest in missile defense,
shown by its funding, was based on threats or political reasons alone.
With the research completed, I hope my results can be generalizable to more defense
technologies than just missile defense. The FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act from
the Department of Defense asked for a total sum of $708 Billion USD; the Missile Defense
Agency, which is directly responsible for the procurement of missile defense technology, will
have a budget of only $8 Billion USD for FY2019 (Missile Defense Agency). Missile defense
represents only a small fraction of the spending needed for new technologies by the military, but
with the general gap in literature and previously conducted research as to what influences the
growth and need for military systems, it is possible the findings in this thesis may explain the
decision to fund systems other than missile defense. In other words, although my case study is
focused on missile defense, the variables I am analyzing in this paper are relevant to all defense
procurement and appropriations. There will never be a single explanation for what drives defense
spending and the purchasing of new technologies, and with the military-industrial complex
playing such a large part in the economy, the reasoning behind continued purchases is
perpetually obscure. This study sheds light on external factors behind funding trends, but
determining why each system is funded would require future research.

Missile Defense
Before progressing, it is important to specify what the term “missile defense” actually
means. Missile defense refers to the systems a nation uses to intercept and destroy incoming
missiles before they can reach their intended targets. Missile defense did not have its origins in
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, although many assume this to be the case. Initial missile
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defense efforts began after World War II due to evidence the Soviet Union was building missiles
comparable to those of the United States, promulgated further by the detonation of the first
Soviet bomb in 1949. In 1955 the United States released Nike Zeus, the first official defense
against intercontinental ballistic missiles, although the first successful intercept was not until
1962. Due to the high cost and uncertainty regarding such a groundbreaking technology, Nike
Zeus was the subject of much scrutiny. The decision was made to discontinue the Nike Zeus
program, abandoned in favor of its successor, Nike -X. “It employed many advanced
technologies, including a new a family of electronic phased array radars… a new terminal
defense interceptor called Sprint, which made possible the use of atmospheric filtering to
discriminate between enemy warheads and decoys; and it retained the Zeus missile, subsequently
modified and renamed Spartan” (Missile Defense Agency). Although Nike -X was heavily
supported by President Kennedy, President Lyndon Johnson called for the deployment of the
Sentinel system upon his ascent to the presidency. Once Nixon took office, he renamed the
Sentinel system Safeguard, and it was used to protect U.S. nuclear forces. These preliminary
systems relied on interceptor missiles with warheads of their own, it was not until 1984 that hitto-kill technology was conceptualized.
The next chapter in the growth of missile defense were the 1972 Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks, or SALT I, which were championed by the Nixon administration and quickly
led to the production of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The provisions of the ABM
Treaty limited both the United States and the Soviets to two interceptor sites, with later changes
reducing the site limit to one. It was a challenge to continue sophistication of existing systems
while staying inside the treaty’s provisional limits, even with the growing need for stronger
missile defense. President Reagan countered this during this presidency and called for a broad
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interpretation of the ABM Treaty, granting the United States more freedom with missile defense.
Clinton would later reverse this decision in 1993. Soon after his declaration, Reagan unveiled his
plan for the Strategic Defense Initiative and raised both awareness and scrutiny of missile
defense. The concept of laser-based systems using machines in space was deemed outlandish,
but Reagan viewed it as a way to “achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by
strategic nuclear missiles.” (Reagan Library) As this statement was made still in the height of the
Cold War, nuclear weapons and the risk of attack was still in the forefront of the U.S.
government’s mind.
The Missile Defense Agency describes the current U.S. system as a layered architecture,
meaning that… Each level serves a specific purpose and ultimately ordered together to target the
missile. Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ initiative was also devised in a similar manner, with an interceptor
layer on the ground and another via satellite, along with a planned command and control system
on the ground (Sanger 1987). The first layer consists of the sensor radar arrays used to track and
detect targets. These radars can either be sea-based or ground-based, some examples being
Army/Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance, the Sea-Based X-Band Radar or the SPY-1
Radar. There are also space- based systems, such as the Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS) or the Space-Based Kill Assessment system (Missile Defense Agency).
The second layer is the actual interceptor stage, composed of systems such as Aegis and
Aegis-Ashore, Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), Standard Missile-3 Interceptors, the Patriot
system and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). To successfully target incoming
missiles, these systems are designed to either detonate in the near proximity of the target and
trigger a premature explosion, or ‘hit-to-kill’, directly striking the missile and rendering it
obsolete before it can reach the target location. Researchers are currently developing technology
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for boost-phase intercepts, meaning missiles could be destroyed during their initial ascent into
the Earth’s atmosphere. This would provide much greater flexibility of action and time to
warfighters, but systems such as these would require 24/7 surveillance and reconnaissance to
know exactly when and where a missile is launched.
In addition, existing systems tend to be either mid-course or terminal-course. This means
they target missiles in the middle of their flight sequence, at the highest point of their arc, or in
the terminal phase once missiles begin their final descent towards their intended target. Targeting
missiles in the launch phase is exponentially more difficult as it requires instantaneous detection
of a missile launch and the ability to fire an interceptor in close proximity to the missile. Also
called boost-phase, the launch phase is the slowest portion of a missile’s journey as it is directly
countering gravity to create enough lift and force to reach its intended target.
The link between the first and second layers is the Command and Control Battle
Management and Communications system (C2BMC). Per the Missile Defense Agency, C2BMC
allows warfighters and military leaders “to systematically plan ballistic missile defense
operations, to collectively see the battle develop, and to dynamically manage designated
networked sensors and weapons systems to achieve global and regional mission objectives”
(Missile Defense Agency). The integration of the interceptors and radars becomes manifest in
this stage, where warfighters are able to determine a missile’s intended target and therefore the
need to launch an interceptor to destroy it. Not all missile defense systems share the same
purpose, however. For example, the Strategic Defense Initiative was envisioned to intercept
ICBMs, the same with the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system located in Alaska. Israel’s
Iron Dome and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), however, are designed to shoot
down intermediate- and other missiles of lesser ranges.
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Operation Desert Storm was the first time a defense system was used to successfully
intercept an incoming enemy missile. During combat, the deployed U.S. Patriot system was able
to stop a Scud missile fired by the Iraqis. It was not long after that development began for the
Patriot Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) and Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), along with
Ground-based Midcourse Defense and Ground-based Interceptors and the Aegis systems. Not
only did Operation Desert Storm showcase the capabilities of missile defense systems on the
battlefield, but it also drew attention away from systems geared solely towards nuclear weapons,
shifting the focus to short- and intermediate-range missiles instead.
Ultimately, missile defense programs have four goals: 1) deterrence, 2) ensured defeat of
enemy attacks, 3) assurance of American allies, and 4) to dissuade any adversaries from pursuing
advanced missile technology (Weitz 2013). First, deterrence refers to discouraging enemy action
based on the threat of the consequences of an attack. In other words, instilling fear in the enemy
as to the American retaliatory measures was the enemy to attack first. Ensured defeat means the
ability to strike down an incoming missile with a kill-vehicle or interceptor, hence why the
military conducts frequent missile defense system tests against prop targets (Pugacewicz 2017).
An example of assuring allies would be the American-deployed Aegis Ashore systems in
Romania to protect NATO countries, or the THAAD systems in South Korea to reassure safety
amidst North Korean aggression. The fourth goal is dissuade other states from pursuing
advanced weapons capabilities. This is what critics of missile defense center on when labeling
BMD as an antagonistic endeavor. States desire weapons that can evade or triumph over defense
systems and therefore develop stronger and more capable technologies (Pugacewicz 2017; Weitz
2010). Examples of this are Russia and China developing cruise missiles that the United States
currently does not have a surefire way to defend against.
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Of course, missile defense programs are not without controversy. Recent discussion
surrounds missile defense and its merit as either a preventative measure against ballistic missile
attacks, or a mode of provocation against American adversaries. Controversy has swirled around
this topic since the Reagan era and the initial idea of the Strategic Defense Initiative, but yet the
reliance upon missile defense has only grown. There are those that argue for arms control instead
of ensuring deterrence through purely defensive means, but arms control simply limits offensive
capabilities and does not provide greater security for a nation (Weinberger 1986). However, the
notion of mutually deterred destruction surrounding the creation of SDI and the Cold War with
Russia would then turn mutual vulnerability into mutual invulnerability, a paradoxical idea
(Feinrider 1986). “SDI, which has as its goal the ability to render harmless Soviet nuclear-armed
missiles, whether they be part of a first or a retaliatory second-strike, hardly qualifies as
"peaceful,"” (Feinrider 1986).
Although the SDI did not come to be, missile defense is still looked at as a method of
“coercion and destruction” by some, with the belief such systems can be used for offensive
means (Norman 1987). Critics claim ballistic missile defense (BMD) can lead to the increased
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), ballistic missiles, technological
advancements by adversaries (what is referred to as vertical proliferation) and can be an
antagonist to other nations with similar capabilities (Pugacewicz 2017). To this, I would respond
that no missile defense system thus far has been tested with 100% accuracy, either by the United
States or other powers, and is more of a reserved defense mechanism if ever an attack were to be
launched against the United States. “Missile defense appears to be closely calibrated with an
active and interventionist global posture for which continued strategic freedom of action is a
precondition.” (Pugacewicz 2017). Frühling claims as well that missile defense challenges the

9

possibility of escalation, affecting “alliance strategy, threat perception” and contributes to the
overall guarantee of security the United States offers to those it is allied with (Frühling 2016).

Literature Review

To understand how and why the design of missile defense systems has changed over
time, it is useful to look towards other areas of research. I First, scholars have discussed what is
classified as a threat to national security, and if the United States is too quick to label an external
conflict as a dire situation desirous of American involvement. Deploying a missile defense
system could be a possible solution to this perceived threat. Furthermore, there are many varying
explanations as to the decision-making behind pursuing a certain technological development or
weapons system, whether it is due to the influence of defense contracting companies or the actual
need for such procurement. Experts have also debated what factors have the greatest influence on
military and defense strategy making, public opinion and the allocated budget to name a few.

Choosing a Defense Technology
Before discussing literature on what factors are included in this study of missile defense,
understanding the process behind military innovation and surrounding theories is a necessity.
Determining which explicit factors influenced missile defense is only possible after knowing
how and why missile defense systems arose. This section describes the relationship between
emerging military capabilities and changes or trends in war.
The process by which the Department of Defense (DoD) enters into agreement with a
defense contracting company has been criticized for being arduous, but before a contract is
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signed the DoD must first identify which capabilities it wishes to develop. Behind this is the idea
of military innovation, where warfare and military capabilities evolve intermittently (Horowitz
2010). This means that new technologies, an example being GPS, leads to increased intelligence
and surveillance over areas of the world. However, the development of GPS might not have been
a necessity in order to wage effective wars yet it changed what warfare looked like. The
relationship between technological development and new warfare abilities or strategies is a
never-ending cycle. Scholars have long debated whether a military changes tactics due to a new
conflict and forces technological advancement, or if technology spurs the evolution of how a
military operates (Horowitz 2010; Durmaz 2016). Within the DoD is the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), responsible for experimenting with new systems and ideas
“to reap the benefits of technological developments” (Durmaz 2016). Arguably the best way to
maintain a strategy of ‘deep engagement’, or forward deployment to maintain security and peace
around the world, is to pursue technologies that allow the United States to do so (Gholz 2017).
Another explanation behind technological procurement is to maintain military
effectiveness. Gregory Hildebrant used the Vietnam War as an example of this, claiming the
increase in B-52 bomber manufacturing, coupled with an increase in payload capability, would
complement the military objective of carpet-bombing of Vietnam. He argued the combatant
commanders at the time analyzed the success and destruction rate of the sorties, determined the
damage done to be insufficient, and asked for the development of larger weapons to increase
military effectiveness (Hildebrant 1999). While this stance is defendable, the majority of
literature argues that advanced technological development is a proactive rather than reactive
measure (Durmaz 2016; Posen 2003). Many point to what is called the Revolution of Military
Affairs, or “intensive use of information technologies and sophisticated weapons systems” that
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allow a country to effectively defend itself (Durmaz 2016). Defense spending is also a potential
“tool of foreign policy influence”, as stronger capabilities not only can intimidate possible
adversaries, but also influence allied countries to adhere to American wishes more frequently
(Blankenship, Miles).
One can also look at the aforementioned notion of military innovation to describe the
current trend in defense procurement; more often than not, newer adaptations and improvements
have been made to already existing system instead of the costlier measure of a brand new
technology. “When the weapons system comes to the end of its useful life, the military unit
needs a successor to justify its continued existence” (Kaldor 1983). Take as an example the
recent improvement of the Aegis system and upgrade of the SM Block-IIA missile to the -IIB
version, the technology may have been past its time but the purpose it served was still vital,
hence the newer upgrades. Literature also exists that speaks of the uncertainty of defense
technological procurement, as the need or initial proposed improvements of a system may shift if
there is a change in the threat environment, lack of equally capable systems while old systems
receive upgrades, or Congress chooses not to allocate funds for further development (Rogerson
1995).

Threat Assessment
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for the structure of American’s missile defense
system is that it evolves alongside the threat environment. This is mainly due to the clear stages
of threats that arose during the past century. During World War II the threat was clearly
exhibited, from German U-Boats vying for control of the Atlantic to the attacks on Pearl Harbor
that spurred the American wartime machine and definitive entry into the war. Transition then to
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the fight against communism in the mid-20th century where the thought of a communist spread
meant imminent danger for the United States. Scholars argue as the Cold War began to dissipate,
however, the lines that once distinctly made a threat clear have begun to fade. Harriet Critchley
explains this by saying “…there was substantial consensus in the West as to who the enemy was,
what the enemy wanted and how the enemy would try to get it…[now] can vary from issue to
issue,” (Critchley 1979).This would then mean national security is “the ability of national
institutions to prevent adversaries from using force to harm Americans or their national interests
and the confidence of Americans..” (Sarkesian 1989).
One of the main discussions surrounding threat classification focuses on strategic value,
or what is outlined as a vital interest to the United States and why. Having clear depictions of
areas of strategic value makes “coherent analysis” of a potential threat possible despite a rapidly
changing and developing world (Critchley 1979). This definition of strategic value is separated
into three ideas: territory, worth and access. Territory means the location of what area of interest
policymakers are looking at, for example Iraq in the Middle East. Worth refers to how vital of an
interest a threat or place may be, take the importance of fighting communism during the Cold
War as an issue of worth. What defines worth, however? Lastly, Critchley defines access as
determining which issues “can affect a state's own security and its relations with allies and
potential adversaries” without detrimental effect to those alliances (Critchley 1979). This is
relevant to my research question because alongside the growth of domestic missile defense, the
United States has also provided systems to her allies in NATO, Japan and Korea. Per Critchley’s
definition, this would be an example of determining an issue that can strengthen a relationship
with an ally while also defending against potential enemies.

13

Compared to this definition, there is also the argument to be made the United States
engages in situations worldwide simply because it has the power to. Whether or not foreign
involvement may be warranted, it is pursued with the goal of maintaining American superiority,
especially militarily, because having such high positioning is what is best for the world (Posen
2003). Posen articulates this further by explaining American “control of the commons”, or land,
air, sea, what he notes as a key enabler of keeping the United States as the chief power
worldwide (Posen 2003). When assessing a threat, therefore, would any situation that might
dispute this superiority then warrant a shift in strategy to counter the challenge and maintain this
“control of the commons”?
Friedman and Logan would counter this by saying alliances are also a factor in
determining what is labeled as a threat to the United States, especially being entangled so greatly
in NATO (Friedman, Logan 2012). They argue that having such strong ties to many countries of
the world leads to greater opportunity for conflict. There are also those that believe alliances help
prevent conflict, as knowing the risk of the United States becoming involved would act as a
deterrent to those powers whose capabilities would pose a minimal threat to the ones America
possesses. This point of view, however, can be countered again by those who believe America is
too eager to get involved both militarily and diplomatically; “Rather than… admit that our
military policy is aimed at something other than safety, we talk as if no corner of the world is too
irrelevant to threaten us.” (Friedman, Logan 2012). Scholars then utilize this thought paradigm to
understand American regime change, counterinsurgency and state-building missions, even in
regions of the world that might not pose such a significant threat to the United States (Friedman,
Logan 2012; Frühling 2016). “Different geographic and political circumstances mean that allies

14

will have different interests and perspectives… then [different] implications on strategy,”
(Frühling 2016).
As proven by these various notions on what constitutes a threat to America and her allies,
there is no one concise definition. It is this lack of such that leads me to analyze the defense
budget and bureaucratic influences behind missile defense procurement. For example, if the
National Security Strategy for one year listed Russia as the greatest threat, this could include the
spread of communism and regional aggression as well as Russian nuclear and missile
capabilities. Simply labeling what is the greatest threat does not provide full clarity on the steps
needed to counter said threat. Since it is possible no two administrations agree on the threat, I
must also look at other variables that may fluctuate alongside a changing threat definition.

Bureaucratic and Domestic Influences
Despite the idea of developing defensive capabilities solely for the purpose of ensuring
American military hegemony, there are several scholars that argue maintaining military might is
not the principal reason for such system development. The political ideology of the president
when constructing his national security policy may also be a factor; Wingerter notes that Reagan,
H.W. Bush, Bush and now President Trump have all advocated for stronger use of missile
defense, as national security and bolstering the defense budget seems to be a recurring trend of
the Republican Party (Wingerter 2011). Each president pushed for stronger military strategy as
well (Wingerter 2011). This theory would suggest that under a conservative President, the
defense budget or defense procurement increases to a level higher than what it might be under a
more liberal administration. When tracing the fluctuation of the defense budget from the year
1981-present, I would then expect to find this trend.

15

The second theory regarding what pushes strategy and decision-making is the strength of
influence over the Pentagon and policymakers, either from interest groups or defense contracting
companies themselves. From exploring literature related to this topic, there is evidence that the
defense-industry relationship is one of mutual beneficence as companies profit from the sales to
the government and the government is able to strengthen the military. There are also experts who
say “corporate dependence on government largesse creates an irresistible economic incentive for
defense contractors to push for larger US military spending” (Wingerter 2011). Major
contractors like Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman all receive 70-90% of their
profits from government contracts (Kaldor 1983; Wingerter 2011; Rogerson 1995; Kulve, Te,
Smit 2003), by default the government is the only body able to purchase and deploy their
products. Some argue this need for profit results in a domestic arms race within the industry,
with companies competing against one another for the contract (Kaldor 1983). When trying to
then determine what explains the growth of missile defense over time, literature on this topic
would then suggest that the need for profit forces the government to procure systems of
insufficient importance, largely in part due to the ever-growing influence of the militaryindustrial complex. This is the opposite of procuring systems based solely on countering a threat.
My research design is structured to provide clarity on this discussion.

Research Design and Methodology

My goal is to uncover what drives the funding of US missile defense over time,
ultimately reflecting the government’s interest in this system since 1983 . Given the discussion
so far, one might hypothesize that assessing a threat environment does not lead to a decisive
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missile defense policy. As seen in the literature, there is no one conclusive measure of what is
deemed a threat or what is a valid interest to the United States. Therefore, I look at other factors
besides the threat environment to determine what shapes missile defense procurement. Although
I include threat as one of the factors in this study, through my research I will explore other
variables that wield an influence such as the political ideology of the legislative and executive
branches, and what these majorities mean for final budgeting allocations.
This study is inherently inductive as I leverage the available evidence to construct a
theory of what shapes missile defense funding. My dependent variable is the funding given to the
Missile Defense Agency from the years 1985 to present, with the threat environment and
political make-up of the executive and legislative branches as my independent variables. Before
moving into the exact methodology of how I will perform this study, it is imperative to first
describe how and why these variables were chosen.
Since its conception under the Reagan administration in 1983, missile defense has
become a cornerstone of U.S. national security strategy. This was not a spontaneous process,
however. I explain how missile defense grew to the system it is today, and in doing so it is
necessary to look for underlying factors behind how a defense policy is made. First and
foremost, the purchasing of any weapons system requires Congressional approval and allocation
of funds based off of what the Department of Defense requests in the National Defense
Authorization Act. Congress must approve and see the need for the procurement of missile
defense systems, and therefore examining the trend of funding for these systems is an important
measure of dictating how they have come to be.
Secondly, the defense budget for each fiscal year is part of the overall government
budget, a contentious topic between the Democratic and Republican Parties. Typically, if the
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Republican Party has a majority in Congress, there is greater support for military strength and
defense. Therefore, political ideology is one of the other variables I look at since political
affiliation is closely tied to government spending. Historically, the Republican Party has praised
itself on fiscal responsibility, focusing on keeping the government accountable and reducing
regulations and unnecessary spending. They are also, somewhat contradictory, the party
dedicated to a strong defense structure and military. I was interested to see what this meant in
terms of the defense budget. The Democratic Party, on the other hand, is still a strong advocate
of national security policy to ensure American safety but has often decreased the defense budget
in the past. By breaking down each year and allocation and tying it to the party in power,
pinpointing a trend in the figures was much clearer.
The last variable I examined is the threat environment from 1981 to present. As
mentioned above, the lack of a concrete definition of threat and what is defined as a vital interest
to the United States means threat may not be the best measure of why and how the missile
defense system has expanded. However, the United States also has a history of threat-based
strategy and procurement and consequently analyzing what was labeled as such is still a vital
part of this study. My initial belief was that having a labeled threat, with the Cold War as an
example and the painting of communism as the one true enemy, gives general permission to
policymakers and the military to engage in almost anything in order to counter said threat. What
I seek to explain, however, is how this might also apply to missile defense.
As I am tracking the changes and growth of missile defense funding since its initial
suggested policy, I utilized a method of research known as process tracing. The first variable I
examined is the defense budget and allocated funds towards missile defense since the mid-1980s
to now. I chose 1983 as the starting year for the defense budget because Ronald Reagan first
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announced his Star Wars initiative to counter the Soviet threat during that time, and missile
defense has only grown in popularity since then. I originally believed funding for missile defense
will be directly tied to my second variable, the perceived threat faced by the United States. This
is the notion of threat-based procurement, and the budget should reflect the necessary funding to
do so. By using the National Security Strategies published by each president since 1987, I was
able to complete this comparison. The documents contain the yearly strategies for the military
and articulate how they will act to respond against world issues and threats. Lastly, it was
necessary to track Congressional legislation and comments by lawmakers about missile defense
when they are voting on the budget or other defense issues. This is directly tied to political
ideology, as many scholars dictate that defense spending is a result of the party affiliation in
power during each administration.
I used process tracing and historical comparison to evaluate how these factors influence
missile defense funding and interest. Process tracing, by definition, “can be used both for case
studies that aim to gain a greater understanding of the causal dynamics that produced the
outcome of a particular historical case and to shed light on generalizable causal mechanisms
linking causes and outcomes within a population of causally similar cases,” (Beach 2017). In
other words, I traced the circumstances behind the missile defense system in place today to
understand its existence. The method of historical comparison is a strong component of this
tracing because even more broadly, I looked to understand how missile defense first was
conceptualized, then made a reality. I then traced its growth process to understand each step in
funding that led to missile defense playing a crucial role in United States deterrence and the
defensive capabilities arsenal. Because I chose to process trace, this study is intrinsically
qualitative. I analyzed some quantitative data like the defense budget, but I did not perform an
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experiment, survey, or regression nor was I looking to gather empirical data, often parts of a
quantitative study.

Data Sources
Defense Budget
The lengthiest portion of my study is dedicated to analyzing the defense budget from the
year 1983 to present. I chose the scope of these years because Reagan first announced the
possibility of the “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative, the first heavily publicized method of
missile defense, in the year 1983. I start in the year 1983 to determine the exact amount of
money dedicated to each service for the procurement of weapons systems before the concept of
missile defense generally came to be. Before Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative
the U.S. military had the Nike-Zeus and Sentinel missile systems, both directed at defending
against Soviet missile launches but both programs were quickly cancelled in the 1960s as they
were considered too provocative. Therefore, the generally accepted beginning of missile defense
and the starting date for the purposes of this study is 1983 under Reagan.
I will first access the approved Congressional budgets from the year 1983 to present in
order to collect the exact dollar amount spent on defense budgeting. Upon collecting these
figures, I will compile a table with the defense budget for each year and then calculate the
percent differences in growth/decrease between each year to gain a better understanding of
trends in defense spending. I will then turn to the National Defense Authorization Acts, which is
the Department of Defense budget requests sent to Congress each fiscal year before the
Congressional budget is set.
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Bureaucratic Politics
To study political ideology, interest groups and politics and how they may have played a
role in the determination of defense spending and strategy, I will collect a series of speech
manuscripts, comments pertaining to missile defense, Congressional memos and floor comments
within defense debate, and any relevant Congressional Research Service reports prepared for
members of Congress. Within the Department of Defense archives as well there are manuscripts
of speeches the Secretary of Defense has given, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and other top military officials. I have already read through several, some dating back to
1981 that discuss the reality of developing a missile defense program and how there will be a
dire need for one in the future. By using these I hope to trace the development of missile defense
as part of national security from its creation, as these speeches contain the thoughts of the
policymakers determining missile defense’s role as part of U.S. strategy. Congressional
Research Service reports are readily available online, and provide a comprehensive nonpartisan
overview of any given topic a Congressman/woman requests. I have already collected seven
pertaining to missile defense, its growth and how the U.S. system compares to those of American
competitors such as Russia and China. Since these reports are extremely detailed and in-depth, I
foresee being able to use these as part of my research to provide a holistic overview of missile
defense.
The most challenging part of this research is locating Congressional texts and memos, as
well as floor debate comments from members that pertain to this study. This is due to the
extensive amount of floor records and minutes from any one session in Congress, narrowing
down the selection to find relevant information will time consuming. Another possible problem
with this approach is personal bias if I am to examine individual remarks from Congressional
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members, individual feelings towards missile defense will not provide an all-inclusive look at
why decisions about funding for missile defense have been made. Also, members most likely are
hesitant to reveal any external influences, more specifically the sway of interest groups. With
that said, taking note of the party each member belongs to who comments on missile defense
may garner a greater understanding of what each ideology thinks of the subject, a helpful tool
when I look through Congressional records to determine which parties had the majority during
the years the budget was signed. I can use this information to explain why there was an increase
or decrease of funding in any given year by knowing what party was in power, and then on the
broader scale, determine a trend in missile defense support or disapproval in policymakers.

Threat Analysis
Lastly, I will be using the National Defense Reviews and National Security Strategy
Archives to identify what threats were deemed most dangerous to the United States from the
years 1987 to present. These reviews include strategies from six different president
administrations: Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and
now President Trump. They will be critical to this study as each encompasses all defense and
military strategy for the United States for any given year, including comprehensive analysis of
what perceived threats have been in the past, which threats the United States is currently facing
and what the Department of Defense and national security professionals expect to encounter in
the future. Within this discussion of the threat are proposed steps the military plans to take in
response which include but are not limited to: the deployment of troops to any given region,
increased funding for peacemaking processes in a given region, increase emphasis on a certain
technology or a suggestion or hint at moving towards a new technology or system.
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Given my proposed examination of what affects missile defense policy and system
development besides what the threat environment is, it is pertinent to first know the labeled
threats by the military for the years I am discussing. I will read through each of the strategies
with main focus on the introduction and opening sections of the acts, where the tendency is to
outline the threats faced by the United States. The later sections contain the proposed solutions,
which I do not find as relevant to this study unless there is a discussion or proposal of a strategy
related to missile defense.
To reiterate, the design of this study is a qualitative method of process tracing in order to
determine the growth and structure of missile defense since its conception in 1981, and to discern
which factors, the budget, threat or political bureaucracy have had the greatest influence over
which missile defense technologies were pursued. During my initial literature review I found
similar studies which discussed the exact methods and reasons for why the government signs
defense contracts, all of which had a similar approach to my own. I am looking to expand further
upon these studies and provide a comprehensive review of missile defense in the United States
and how and why it is the system in place today.

Results
Budget
As described above, I use budgeting for missile defense programs as my dependent
variable. The goal of this study is to depict the growth of missile defense with the agency’s
budget as its proxy, and in doing so I first compare the national defense budget (Graph 1.1) to
the Missile Defense Agency budget (Graph 1.2) to discern if there are patterns in the funding of
U.S. defense as a whole that match the pattern of funding for missile defense. Exact budget
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details for the Missile Defense Agency, labeled the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization at
the time, were unavailable until the year 1985, when the SDIO had an operating budget of $1.4
Billion. Therefore, my comparative analysis of the budget cannot definitively begin until the year
1985.
Graph 1.1

(Data Courtesy of SIPRI)
21 of the 34 years of this comparison (1985-2019) showed an annual increase in both the
annual defense and Missile Defense Agency budget. During the years 1991, 1993-1994, and
2012-2014 there was a decrease in both MDA and defense. MDA’s budget increased four
separate times while the defense budget decreased (1988, 1996, 1998, 2015), but decreased
seven times while the overall defense budget grew (1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2017, 2018).
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(Data Courtesy of MDA)
Additionally, from 1987 to 1988 the MDA budget increased by $.4 Million while the
defense budget remained stagnant, and from 1994 to 1995 the MDA budget remained at $2.8
Billion while the defense budget increased. The largest increase in MDA funding was from
2001-2002 with an increase of $3 Billion, and the largest decrease was 2013-2014 where funding
was lessened by $1.3 Billion. The decade of largest missile defense funding growth was 19952005, starting at $2.8 Billion in 1995 and finishing at $9 Billion in 2005.

Bureaucratic Influences
This section contains the MDA appropriation figures and political parties from the
President and both chambers of Congress, as well as attempted legislation in Congress regarding
missile defense. Table 1.1 combines the dependent funding for the Missile Defense Agency with
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the independent variable of political ideology, and Table 1.2 shows the proposed legislation
compared to the parties in majority. Each row of Table 1.1 contains the appropriations amount in
Billions USD that the President asked for, what each chamber of Congress offered and then what
the final appropriation amount was. Congressional majorities were included to help determine
trends between the funding levels and dominant political parties deciding the amount. The lowest
amount given to MDA since its conception was $1.4B USD in 1985, and the highest was $9B
USD in 2009, the last budget passed by George W. Bush. The largest disparity between a
presidential request and final appropriation is -$1.6BUSD, with 1988 as an example. President
Reagan requested $5.2B USD yet the ultimate appropriation was $3.6B USD. 14 of the 32 years
the Democratic party held the House majority, compared to the 17 years it held in the Senate.

MDA Appropriations 1985-2017

Table 1.1

Year

President

House

Senate

Actual

Congressional Majorities

1985

1.8 (Reagan -R)

1.1

1.6

1.4

House - D

Senate - R

1986

3.7 (Reagan -R)

2.5

3.0

2.8

House - D

Senate - R

1987

4.8 (Reagan -R)

3.1

3.4

3.2

House - D

Senate - D

1988

5.2 (Reagan -R)

3.1

3.6

3.6

House - D

Senate - D

1989

4.5 (Reagan -R)

3.2

3.1

3.7

House - D

Senate - D

1990

4.6 (H.W. Bush -R)

3.1

4.3

4.0

House - D

Senate - D

1991

4.5 (H.W. Bush -R)

2.3

3.6

2.9

House - D

Senate - D

1992

5.2 (H.W. Bush -R)

3.5

4.6

4.1

House - D

Senate - D

1993

5.4 (H.W. Bush -R)

4.3

3.8

3.8

House - D

Senate - D

1994

3.8 (Clinton -D)

2.8

2.8

2.8

House - D

Senate - D

1995

3.2 (Clinton -D)

2.8

2.8

2.8

House - R

Senate - R

1996

2.9 (Clinton -D)

3.5

3.4

3.4

House - R

Senate - R
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1997

2.8 (Clinton -D)

3.5

3.7

3.7

House - R

Senate - R

1998

2.6 (Clinton -D)

3.7

3.6

3.8

House - R

Senate - R

1999

3.6 (Clinton -D)

3.4

3.4

3.5

House - R

Senate - R

2000

3.3 (Clinton -D)

3.6

3.9

3.6

House - R

Senate - R

2001

4.5 (Clinton -D)

4.6

4.8

4.8

House - R

Senate - D

2002

8.3 (W. Bush -R)

7.9

6.3

7.8

House - R

Senate - R

2003

6.7 (W. Bush -R)

7.4

6.2

7.4

House - R

Senate - R

2004

7.7 (W. Bush -R)

7.5

8.2

7.7

House - R

Senate - R

2005

9.2 (W. Bush -R)

8.7

9.2

9.0

House - R

Senate - R

2006

7.8 (W. Bush -R)

7.6

7.9

7.8

House - R

Senate - R

2007

9.3 (W. Bush -R)

8.9

9.4

9.4

House - D

Senate - D

2008

8.9 (W. Bush -R)

8.6

8.7

8.7

House - D

Senate - D

2009

9.3 (W. Bush -R)

8.4

9.0

9.0

House - D

Senate - D

2010

7.8 (Obama -D)

7.8

7.8

7.9

House - D

Senate - D

2011

8.4 (Obama -D)

8.6

8.4

8.5

House - R

Senate - D

2012

8.6 (Obama -D)

8.6

8.4

8.4

House - R

Senate - D

2013

7.8 (Obama -D)

8.4

8.3

8.3

House - R

Senate - D

2014

7.7 (Obama -D)

8.0

7.8

7.6

House - R

Senate - D

2015

7.4 (Obama -D)

7.7

7.6

7.8

House - R

Senate - R

2016

8.1 (Obama -D)

8.1

8.3

8.3

House - R

Senate - R

2017

7.5 (Obama -D)

7.8

8.0

8.2

House - R

Senate - R

(Data Courtesy of the MDA)
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History of Missile Defense Legislative and Executive Action
Year
1983

Title and Source
National Security
Decision Directive 85
(Reagan)

Purpose
To promote strategic arms
reduction, while placing
emphasis on defensive
systems instead of offensive

Table 1.2

Congressional Result
H. of R. - Democratic
Senate - Republican
Result - N/A

1983 - Reagan calls for broad interpretation of ABM Treaty, allowing for missile defenses
1991

H.R. 1446 (Timothy
Penny, D-MN)

To establish a Joint Tactical
Missile Defense program as
research counterpart to the
SDI Organization

H. of R. - Democratic
Senate - Democratic
Result - N/A

1993 - Clinton returns to narrow approach, banning ABM system deployments per treaty
1995

1995

1996

1996

H.R. 7 (James Hayes DLA, Benjamin Gilman RNY, Floyd Spence R-SC,
Ed Bryant R-TN)

To ensure system readiness,
develop Theater Missile
Defense (TMD) system and
to produce ground-based
interceptors

H. of R. - Republican
Senate - Republican

H.R. 2483 (Martin Hoke,
R-OH)

H. of R. - Republican
Senate - Republican

“Defend America Act I”

To urge President to
withdraw from ABM Treaty
and successfully test missile
defense systems

National Defense
Authorization Act
(Introduced by Senator
Thurmond, crafted by
DoD)

To develop Theater and
National Missile Defense
systems (NMD), to negotiate
with Russia and if necessary,
withdraw from ABM Treaty

H. of R. - Republican
Senate - Republican

S. 1635 (Robert Dole, RKS)

To develop and deploy an
operational NMD system
before the year 2003

H. of R. - Republican
Senate - Republican

“Defend America Act II”
1998

1999

Result - Passed House, Senate
hearings held but no vote

Result - Introduced,

Result - Voted upon by both
chambers, signed into law

Result - Considered in Senate

Commission to Assess
the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United
States (Committee
appointed by bipartisan
leadership)

Found the possibility of
advanced launch warning
waning, the U.S. must
strengthen its radar and
detection systems as the
threat is growing

H. of R. - Republican
Senate - Republican

S. 257 (Thad Cochran, RMS)

To declare U.S. policy of
deploying NMD as soon as
possible, and to continue
negotiations with Russia over
ABM Treaty provisions

H. of R. - Republican
Senate - Republican

“National Missile
Defense Act of 1999”

Result - N/A

Result - Passed in Senate
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2002 - United States withdraws from the ABM Treaty

(Data courtesy of Congress)
Table 1.2 above reflects major legislation attempts and policy changes regarding missile
defense from 1983-2002. All five attempts to create laws regarding missile defense (H.R. 1446,
H.R. 7, H.R. 2483, S. 1635, S. 157) failed before being introduced and considered in both
chambers of Congress. Reagan released his security directive in 1983, shifting the policy
discussion towards SDI and more defense programs. No voting was required as it was simply a
policy outline. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1996 was the only one of the acts
above to pass through Congress, calling for funds for missile defense to counter Russian
aggression. The 1996 NDAA presented guidelines for further debate and allocations as to how to
address the issue of missile defense. As well, all NDAAs must pass in both chambers of
Congress in order to begin the budgeting process.

National Security Threats
Below, Tables 1.3 and 1.4 depict the results from my investigation into the National
Security Strategies published from the year 1987-2017. In the 17 strategies I analyzed, missile
defense is mentioned under the defense and military chapters a total of 34 times. It most
frequently appeared in President Bill Clinton’s review from 2001, a total of 5 times. Barack
Obama had no mention of missile defense in either of his strategies from 2015 or 2016. Of the 34
mentions, the most frequent keywords I counted were ‘threat’ and ‘strategy/strategic’, a total of
11 and 18 times, respectively. ‘Deterrence’ was mentioned 9 times out of the 34, and ‘safety’
was counted as 3. Nuclear proliferation and Weapons of Mass Destruction were listed as the
greatest threats 9 times out of the 17 listed threats. The Soviet Union, or Russia in later times,
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was listed as the greatest threat of the year on 6 separate occasions. Ethnic conflict was listed
four times, China and the rise of terrorism were both mentioned twice. The spread of
communism, regional threats, political transitions and North Korea were all mentioned once.

National Security Strategy Missile Defense Mentions
Year

President

# of
Mentions

Table 1.3

Greatest Threat:

1987

Ronald Reagan

4

The Soviet Union and spread of communism

1988

Ronald Reagan

2

The Soviet Union and their nuclear arsenal

1990

George H.W.
Bush

3

The Soviet Union and their integration into the Free World

1991

George H.W.
Bush

3

The Soviet Union and their nuclear arsenal

1993

George H.W.
Bush

2

Potential regional threats

1994

Bill Clinton

1

Ethnic conflict and nuclear proliferation

1995

Bill Clinton

1

Ethnic conflict and political transitions

1996

Bill Clinton

2

Nuclear proliferation

1997

Bill Clinton

2

Nuclear proliferation and Weapons of Mass Destruction

1998

Bill Clinton

2

Ethnic conflict and nuclear proliferation

2000

Bill Clinton

1

Nuclear Proliferation

2001

Bill Clinton

5

Russia, China, North Korea, ethnic conflict

2002

George W.
Bush

2

Rise of terrorism

2006

George W.
Bush

1

Rise of terrorism

2015

Barack Obama

0

Weapons of Mass Destruction

2016

Barack Obama

0

Weapons of Mass Destruction

2017

Donald Trump

3

Russia and China

(Data courtesy of NSSA)
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Frequency of Keywords in all National Security Strategies:

Table 1.4

Threat

Deterrence

Strategy/Strategic

Safety

11

9

18

3

(Data Courtesy of NSSA)

Analysis

Per my hypotheses, after compiling my data I expected these variables- the threat
environment, party ideologies and pertinent legislation - equally affected the growth and
deployment of new missile defense systems. The military will request a certain budget amount to
best prepare forces to fight new threats, and Congress and the Executive branch presumably will
respect that request while announcing their own versions of the federal budget. Overall, the
findings above show that a connection does exist between the these factors, but for any particular
year it may be difficult to isolate what may have the greatest influence over the funding for the
Missile Defense Agency and/or a new missile defense system.
As shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2, there is a direct connection relationship between the
overall U.S. defense budget and the budget allotted to the Missile Defense Agency. Both steadily
increased since the year 1985 to now, and most of the minor decreases mirrored each other. As
the Missile Defense Agency budget is a portion of the overall defense budget, it is only normal to
assume there will be a general trend between the two.
Upon comparing the budget variable with that of the perceived threat from the National
Security Strategies, the trend and strength of relationship between the two was generally as
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distinct as that of the two budgets. As Ronald Reagan initially championed the concept of the
Strategic Defense Initiative and the need for missile defense, the MDA budget grew from $1.4B
USD in 1985 to $3.7B USD in 1989 when George H.W. Bush assumed the presidency. During
those years, even up to 1991, Reagan and H.W. Bush both listed the Soviet Union, the spread of
communism, and the Soviet nuclear arsenal as the greatest threats facing the United States. The
Clinton years also saw a general raise in the MDA budget, with six of the seven security
strategies his administration published outlining weapons of mass destruction as the greatest
threat, going so far as to identify Chinese, North Korean and Russian missiles as the most
dangerous at the beginning of 2001. 1999, however, the one year of the Clinton administration
where a security strategy was not published, was the only year during his tenure of 1993-2001
that the MDA budget decreased. All other years that weapons of mass destruction were labeled
as a threat the MDA budget either increased in conjunction with the overall defense budget, or
increased while the overall defense budget faced a decline. From this, it shows there is a
definitive tie between what is outlined as a threat and what funds are allocated. This would make
sense considering when the Department of Defense presents to Congress its National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) for each year, the President also has influence over policy initiatives
and what goals it would like the Department of Defense to achieve. Therefore, if the President
declares the need for missile defense as an overarching strategic goal, the Department of Defense
will structure its NDAA to reflect such requests before presenting it to the Congress.
Although most of the data supports this trend, the Obama and Trump years contradict the
notion that an Executive-acknowledged threat always has the greatest pull on the budget. During
2015 and 2016 Obama listed weapons of mass destruction as the greatest threat, going so far as
to say “Our military will remain ready to deter and defeat threats to the homeland, including
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against missile, cyber, and terrorist attacks, while mitigating the effects of potential attacks…”
(Obama 2015). While this passage may hint towards having a readily deployable missile defense
system, neither of Obama’s National Security Strategies directly mention the term ‘missile
defense’ or its importance, compared to the 1-5 mentions range seen in all the other documents.
During both those years, the missile defense budget increased. On the other hand, Trump’s 2017
document calls for enhanced missile defense as a strategic necessity for the U.S. but the MDA
budget has steadily decreased since then, even while general defense funding has increased.
Factors outside of this study, such as budget concessions in order to achieve other goals, might
help explain this disparity between the threat and budget.
What is interesting to see, however, is how desired funding appropriations differed
between the President and the chambers of Congress based on political ideology. My initial
expectation was that a split-party setting - when the President is from a different party than the
majority of both Congress chambers - would lead to lesser funding for missile defense than the
amount requested by the President. For the Reagan years, this hypothesis came true. For many
years of his presidency, Reagan was battling a Democratic majority in both the House and the
Senate. Even in 1985 and 1985, where the House was Democratic and the Senate Republican, the
funding amount allotted to missile defense was much less than the executive branch asked for.
The same remained true for the George H.W. Bush presidency, the amount he requested was
greatly lessened by the Democratic Congress. However, from Clinton on, there was not as much
of a discrepancy between the funding requests. During the early years of the Clinton
administration, when Clinton was first faced with a fully Republican majority Congress, and then
the second year with a fully Democratic Congress, both appropriated final amounts were less
than Clinton requested. After this, however, final amounts tended to be higher than what the
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President asked for, regardless of conflicting party ideologies. As the Strategic Defense Initiative
and further missile defense development was once seen as an extremely conflictual goal, it
would then make sense that Reagan and H.W. Bush faced more funding denials and reductions
than the other administrations of this study.
It is possible there was general unwillingness to fund such a controversial and untested
system. After Operation Desert Storm, however, we see the funding for missile defense generally
increase above the amount desired by the President. This change was regardless of party,
suggesting that the actual threat of Iraqi Scud missiles was the catalyst in the missile defense
decision-making process. Before Desert Storm, party lines did seem to have an influence in the
funding amount. It is possible, however, that what drove the funding amounts for further missile
defense development started out as an ideological battle against a President outside of the party,
but transitioned to a threat-based motivation after facing actual missiles in a battle.

Conclusion

As outlined in the literature, what may constitute a threat depends on what an individual
state considers a risk to its own security or strategy (Critchley 1979). When discussing missile
defense in any of the National Security Strategies, missiles posing a threat to the U.S. and the
need for strategic defenses were the two most frequently used phrases throughout the strategies.
This strengthens the hypothesis that missile defense is directly tied to a threat environment, and
is strengthened even further by the greater funding of missile defense after Operation Desert
Storm. Be that as it may, what the comparison of the National Security Strategies and the
funding amounts show is that the threat outlined in the strategies had very little effect on
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budgeting. The strategies from the years 1990, 1995, 2001, 2002, 2006 and 2017 did not mention
nuclear proliferation or weapons of mass destruction as part of the greatest threats, yet the final
funding levels were comparably higher than the amounts requested by the President, considered
the author of the National Security Strategies.
What this discrepancy shows, along with the changes in funding, is that there is no one
factor that determines how missile defense developments continue. It would be nearly impossible
to call these changes arbitrary, and it is equally difficult to pinpoint the exact motivations and
decisions that together shape interest in missile defense systems. Yet, the data gathered in this
study show demonstrate that threat and political lines are all influential in determining funding,
and ultimately interest in missile defense systems.
Due to the nature of the topic, it will be impossible to ever know the full decision-making
process underlying missile defense. This begs the question of public accountability, and if the
general public can keep the Department of Defense and ultimately the government responsible
for their actions. Of course, due to national security reasons there are new systems and behindthe-scenes decisions that need to remain confidential, that is only to be expected. However, there
should be general transparency as to how systems like missile defense are being funded, as well
as explanations for why the U.S. should pay for such technologies. It should not be a challenge to
determine how or why the government spends money on certain items. Additionally, what does
the lack of one deciding factor in procurement decisions mean for future capabilities and
purchases moving forward? If there is no clarity as to what makes a system necessary, how can
the government predict for future needs and technologies? This is important because it represents
a lack of consistency and ability to determine vital aspects of American defense capabilities.
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Upon completing this study I still am still unable to determine if the threat environment
or bureaucratic politics held a greater influence, so there is no simple answer to the question of
what explains interest in missile defense since 1985. There were years, the year 2000 for
example, where the greatest outlined threat to national security was nuclear proliferation yet
missile defense funding dropped $.2B USD from the $3.8B USD it was two year prior, when the
greatest threat was still nuclear proliferation. If the threat environment was the biggest influence,
missile defense funding against ICBMs should have increased, especially as the Congressional
majorities stayed the same. This serves as another instance where what the expected public
outcome is actually different from the true outcome, strengthening my finding that there are
possible factors underneath the surface that wield heavy influence. Perhaps this is concessions in
one area of funding in order to secure funding for another, party politics or other more
inconsistent measures. Wingerter was correct in his research then, that there is often a lack of
clarity between defense contracting companies and the government (Wingerter 2011). With that
said, it is the hope all defense decisions are still made with the best interests of the country in
store (Gholz 2017).
The findings of this study can greatly help policymakers moving forward as it shows the
need for clear reasons behind all allocations and appropriations. The U.S. government’s spending
each year continues to rise, and I predict there are certain items allocated for in the budget which
are not a priority or immediate concern of the government, not just in the defense sector. Moving
forward, weighing each funding request and service against one another not only would produce
a clear budget and easy for the public to follow, but would also help reduce sunk costs or
loopholes for programs no longer needed. This would also help to reduce the federal debt. As
well, utilizing this practice in the defense budget can help predict for future needs, like
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previously mentioned. This would ensure every American dollar spent is going towards a
necessary cause and that the US is adequately prepared for future conflicts.
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